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INTRODUCTION 
Initially, the Level 51 hearing officer concluded that Moon's termination was 
appropriate in light of what she labeled a "pattern of conduct". R., 45. The hearing officer 
found that Moon had intentionally violated state regulations by not stopping his adult son, 
Nathan, from shooting an antelope which was a hundred yards across the state line. The 
hearing officer also found that Moon had "abused his position" by inquiring as to whether, 
and how, his son's PHU permit could be transferred to another unit. From these two 
incidents, the hearing officer decided that Moon had engaged in a "pattern" of misconduct 
which warranted termination. 
In fact, no pattern existed, as the CSRB held2 on appeal that the there was no 
substantial evidence to support the allegation of "abuse of position", because neither Randy 
Moon nor his son, Ryan, acquired any benefit to which they were not entitled by law. R, 143-
144. 
This leaves the Department with only the wildlife incident - an incident for which the 
Department did not terminate Moon until after the "abuse of position" charge had been 
made3 - an incident in which Moon was not the shooter, and where no intentional violation 
]The Level 5 hearing is conducted by a hearing officer under the control of the 
Career Service Review Board. 
2The hearing officer's decision was appealed to the CSRB Board, which issued a 
separate opinion. 
3The Department did not conduct an investigation until after it was informed of the 
wildlife incident. Moon was then suspended pending this investigation. The Department 
then told Moon it had "discovered" that Moon had engaged in an "abuse of position" -
something about which the Department had known for three months. 
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was committed. Even if this Court assumes that the facts concerning the wildlife incident are 
exactly as found by the CSRB, Moon's actions relating to this incident do not merit 
termination. The Department knew this when it refrained from terminating Moon after the 
wildlife incident, and knows this even now as it attempts to have the Court overturn the 
CSRB's decision regarding the "abuse of position" charge. There would be no other reason 
to assert that cross-appeal, inasmuch as the Department was awarded the relief sought (i.e. 
upholding the termination). 
The CSRB did not err when it found that Moon had committed no abuse of position; 
its error was upholding Moon's termination based solely on the wildlife incident. This was 
not contemplated by the Department at the time of Moon's termination, nor by the hearing 
officer when she upheld said termination. Termination is simply not warranted by a single, 
unintentional act, even z/that act was negligent. Therefore, the determination that Moon's 
termination was proper for his participation in the wildlife incident should be overturned. 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
1. Moon was not immediately terminated by the Department for his participation 
in the wildlife incident. Instead, he was placed on suspension pending an investigation. 
Moon's son, Nathan, was immediately terminated from his seasonal position with the 
Department. R. at 146-147, 893-897. 
2. The Department's investigation came up with the charge of'abuse of position", 
for an incident which allegedly occurred in October, 1997 - months before the wildlife 
incident, and something which had never even been reported by the Ogden office. R., 350-
2 
352. Moon was then terminated after this investigation had been completed, for both the 
wildlife infraction and the "abuse of position" charge. R., 52, 147. 
3. Moon appealed his termination to the CSRB. At a Step 5 hearing, Moon's 
termination was upheld on the basis of a "pattern of abuse", namely, the wildlife incident and 
Moon's "abuse of discretion". R., 34-52. 
4. Moon appealed this decision to the CSRB. After considering written 
memorandum and hearing argument, the Board held that Moon did not engage in an abuse 
of position (but upheld the termination based on the wildlife charge alone). R., 133-144, 154. 
5. The following facts pertain to the "abuse of position" charge. In July, 1997, 
Moon's son Ryan had drawn a permit to hunt Moose on a PHU in Utah. This PHU was 
entitled "East Fork Chalk Creek". R., 135.4 
6. A PHU is a privately owned area of property on which landowners allow both 
public and private visitors to hunt. Public hunters are selected to hunt through a random 
drawing. R., 135. Up until 1993, PHU's were administered on an experimental basis, and 
interim guidelines were used by the Department to help supervise the PHUs. The PHU 
program has now been codified by the Utah legislature, and the Department has created 
various rules and regulations for these PHUs. However, many new proclamations and 
regulations have come about in recent years, creating a good deal of confusion, and ensuring 
that no Department official could know every applicable rule. R., 581-584; 1094-1101. 
4There is no allegation that there were any improprieties with this draw. 
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7. In or about September, 1997, Moon was informed by Cal Haskell, manager of 
the PHU, that no moose had been found on the particular PHU Ryan was to hunt on. Haskell 
informed Moon that he was going to transfer all of the "East Fork" hunters (i.e. both private 
hunters who paid to hunt and public hunters), including Moon's son Ryan, to another PHU 
at "South Fork". This transfer was at no time suggested by Moon, nor did Moon do anything 
at all to facilitate such transfer. R., 136; 754-755; 841-843. 
8. In October, 1997, Haskell again called Moon. This time, Haskell informed 
Moon that the transfer had been arranged for three private hunters on the PHU. The transfer 
was done by Haskell, who had submitted a letter to the Ogden regional office pursuant to 
instructions he received from the Ogden office. Haskell also informed Moon that his son, 
Ryan, had been left off the transfer list by mistake. R., 136. 
9. Haskell also told Moon that he had tried to reach Lou Cornicelli, the regional 
manager in Ogden, but had been unable to do. Haskell then asked Moon if he could contact 
Cornicelli instead. R., 137-138. 
10. Wanting to ensure that everything was legitimate, Moon first spoke with Wes 
Shields, the wildlife section manager, and head of the PHU program, to ask him about 
transfer protocol. Shields looked at the regulation, and told Moon that a transfer from one 
PHU to another was allowed, as long as approval was received from the Ogden regional 
office. R., 620-622; 845-848. 
11. Moon then called Cornicelli and explained the situation to him. Cornicelli told 
Moon he needed to speak to his supervisor, Robert Hasenyager, first. Hasenyager instructed 
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Cornicelli to simply write in Ryan's name on the transfer list. Cornicelli did so, and informed 
Moon that his son would be added to the transfer list. Cornicelli later faxed a copy of this list 
to Moon. Importantly, both Haskell and Cornicelli testified that there was no coercion 
whatsoever placed upon them by Moon. R., 139; 695-698; 845-848. 
12. After his suspension for the wildlife incident, and after the investigation of 
Ryan's transfer some three months after the fact, Moon was informed that he had also 
committed an "abuse of position" violation, and was being terminated purportedly for this 
"abuse", as well as for the wildlife incident. Moon was terminated in February, despite the 
fact that the moose hunt itself had occurred in October, while the wildlife incident had 
occurred in December, 1997. Moon was not cited, reprimanded or otherwise penalized for 
the transfer to the "South Fork" PHU until his February termination, despite the fact that all 
relevant facts were known by the Department in early October. R., 855-859; 896-897. 
13. The other Department officers involved in the addition of Ryan Moon to the 
transfer PHU were not terminated. Lou Cornicelli, who had authorized the addition, was not 
even reprimanded for the incident. Cornicelli's superior, Robert Hasenyager, who had 
approved the addition, was only given a letter of caution, and received no discipline from the 
Department. R., 368; 726-727. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. MOON'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF HIS APPEAL. 
I. THE CSRB DID NOT CORRECTLY APPLY THE LAW, INCLUDING 
POLICIES, RULES AND STATUTES, IN ITS DETERMINATION TO 
UPHOLD MOON'S TERMINATION. 
Although the Department attempts to spin or otherwise misstate Moon's arguments, 
the real question before the Court is whether Moon should have been terminated for a single, 
unintentional wildlife violation. Under CSRB precedent, rules and statutes, it is evident that 
the CSRB erred in its determination. The Department's arguments do not lead to a contrary 
result. 
1. Although a Correction of Error Standard Applies, Moon Has Nevertheless 
Marshaled the Evidence to Show That His Wyoming Citation was Unintentional. 
The Department has stated its usual laundry-list argument that Moon has not 
marshaled the evidence that he intentionally participated in the wildlife incident for which 
the CSRB upheld his termination. However, this argument ignores a number of facts. 
First, by his inclusion of the CSRB's findings in his Appellate Brief, Moon did, in fact, 
marshal the evidence necessary to show that he did not knowingly involve himself in the 
wildlife incident. The factual findings made by the CSRB simply do not show that Moon 
knew or should have known that Nathan Moon was in Wyoming when he shot the antelope. 
Instead, they show that there was confiision as to just where one boundary ended and another 
began once one left the main road. R., 144-146. Neither Ryan, Nathan nor Randy Moon 
knew they were in Wyoming when Nathan shot the antelope. R., 146. The fact that Moon, 
a respected state employee with an exemplary record, did not immediately turn his son in to 
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the Wyoming authorities only bolsters the fact that he did not know that an infraction had 
been committed at the time. Therefore, as Moon argues in his Appellate Brief, it simply is 
not reasonable or rational to believe that Moon knew or should have known he was in 
Wyoming when Nathan shot the antelope. 
Second, the question on appeal is whether the finding that Moon "knew or should 
have known" he was in Wyoming, is enough to terminate Moon under the law, including all 
the facts, prior case law, relevant policies, rules, and statutes. Utah Admin. Code R137-1-
21(D)(3). The standard for such a determination is a correction of error standard, which does 
not give deference to incorrect legal conclusions. See Savage Industries v. State Tax 
Commission. 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991). Thus, as explained in Moon's Appellate Brief, and 
below, even if the CSRB's factual findings as to the wildlife incident are "reasonable and 
rational", they do not lead to the legal conclusion drawn by the CSRB because CSRB 
precedent and other case law, rules and regulations, and the prior practice of the Department, 
all show that termination is simply too harsh a penalty for a single, unintentional mistake 
while off duty. 
While the Department argues that Moon knowingly and intentionally engaged in an 
active violation of law, this was not the finding of the CSRB. Instead, the CSRB held that 
Moon "knew or should have known" that he was in Wyoming at the time of the wildlife 
incident. See, e.g., R., 149, 153 (emphasis added). This is not the language used when 
holding someone accountable for intentional acts; instead, it is used to describe negligent 
or reckless conduct. See Galloway v. AFCO Development Corp..777 P.2d 506, 509 (Utah 
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App. 1989)(finding that one "knew or should have known" describes negligent or reckless 
conduct, not intentional torf):Golding v. Ashley Central Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897, 901 
(Utah 1990)(willful misconduct is not equivalent to gross negligence or recklessness). Thus, 
Moon's limited participation in the wildlife incident was not found to be intentional, but 
either negligent or at worst reckless. This finding, in light of Moon's record, his length of 
service, and other mitigating circumstances, including the fact that the Department has not 
terminated its employees for such conduct in the past, see infra, and in light of the applicable 
law, necessitates the legal conclusion that Moon should not have been terminated5 for this 
single act. As Moon has argued throughout this litigation, his conduct simply lacks the 
culpability required for termination, as opposed to demotion or another form of discipline. 
Because the CSRB failed to reach this conclusion, it's decision is arbitrary and capricious and 
should be overturned. 
For each of these reasons, the Department's laundry-list argument that Moon has not 
marshaled the facts is at once irrelevant and incorrect. What is relevant is that Moon was 
terminated in error. 
5As noted infra, neither the Department nor the CSRB ever explain why Moon 
could not have been disciplined without being terminated for the wildlife incident. Moon 
could have been demoted, sanctioned, or otherwise disciplined without being terminated. 
Indeed, progression of punishment is envisioned by Utah Admin. Code. R477-10-2 and 
R477-11-1(3). Without any discussion of other possible punishments, the Department 
applied and the CSRB enforced Moon's termination. The fact that other disciplinary 
tactics were wholly ignored provides yet another example of the arbitrary and 
unreasonable treatment afforded Moon throughout this litigation. 
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2. Division of Parks and Recreation v. Robert O. Anderson and D. Dennis 
Weaver Shows That the CSRB's Decision Was Unprecedented and Illogical. 
In its Appellate Brief, the Department strives fervently to distance itself from prior 
CSRB precedent, namely the Weaver decision. 3 PRB 22 (1986). These efforts are 
understandable, as the Weaver decision clearly shows that Moon's participation in the 
wildlife incident did not merit termination. Although the argument is unclear, it appears that 
the Department contends that, due to a modification in the applicable CSRB Rule, had 
Weaver been decided under the present rules, Dennis Weaver's termination would have been 
upheld. The problem with this argument is three fold: first, and most importantly, this 
argument was not raised below. Therefore it should be ignored by this Court. Second, the 
Department has presented absolutely no evidence that Weaver would have been decided 
differently, and has wholly failed to explain why the reasoning and rationale of that decision 
should not apply to the case at hand; finally, the Department has failed to explain why the 
CSRB felt obliged to address Weaver in its decision if that case no longer applied. 
It is black letter law that "issues not raised in the trial court in a timely fashion are 
deemed waived, precluding the [appellate court] from considering their merits on appeal". 
Hart v. Salt Lake County Com'n. 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah App. 1997), quoting Ohline Corp. 
v. Granite Mill. 849 P.2d 602, 604, n.l (Utah App. 1993). See also West One Bank v. Life 
Ins. Co.. 887 P.2d 880, 882, n.l (Utah App. 1994). The Department never raised the issue 
that Weaver no longer applies below, either before the hearing officer or before the Board. 
In fact, throughout these proceedings, the Department has attempted to utilize or factually 
distinguish the Weaver case to show that Moon's actions were more culpable than Weaver's. 
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See, e.g., R., 105. This factual distinction was also argued orally before the Board. 
Therefore, the Department may not raise the claim that new regulations render Weaver 
obsolete before this Court. 
However, even if the Court allowed presentation of this argument for the first time on 
appeal, the argument is without merit. The Department states that Weaver no longer applies 
because a different administrative Rule now governs the CSRB. The Department notes that 
the old Rule, in effect at the time the Weaver decision was made, stated that: 
The Board's standard of review consists of determining whether the Hearing 
Officer's decision was supported by substantial evidence and whether the 
decision is warranted by the facts. 
Department's Brief, p. 17. The Department then cites the new Rule, which states that 
[T]he Board must determine whether the decision of the CSRB hearing officer, 
including the totality of the sanctions imposed by the agency, is reasonable and 
rational based upon the ultimate factual findings and correct application of 
relevant policies, rules and statutes determined according to the above 
provisions. 
id., p. 18. 
The Department cites no authority which states that these rules differ so substantially 
as to severely limit prior CSRB precedent or supervisory authority over hearing officers who 
err. The relevant cases cited by the Department instead hold that the CSRB should overturn 
a hearing officer's determination if the "sanction [imposed by the hearing officer] is so 
disproportionate to the charges that it amounts to an abuse of discretion". Lunnen v. Utah 
Dept. of Transp.. 886 P.2d 70, 72 (Utah App. 1994); Utah Dept. of Corrections v. Despain. 
824 P.2d 439, 443 (Utah App. 1991). While Despain was decided before the Rule changed, 
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and Lunnen was decided after the change, both cases hold that a termination should be 
overturned if disproportionate to his offense. Neither of these cases, nor the others cited by 
the Department, conclude that the amendment to Board Rule 19.8.2 materially changed the 
ability of the CSRB to reverse an employee's termination. 
Nor can the difference the Department urges be discerned by reading the language of 
the two Rules themselves. If anything, the latter Rule more clearly allows the CSRB to 
review a hearing officer's decision in light of other statutes, regulations and precedent, and 
in light of common sense and all the circumstances. Not surprisingly, this is very similar to 
the decision-making process employed by the Board in the Weaver case. There, the Board 
looked to relevant statutes, 3 PRB 22, pp. 16-21 (1986), and prior case law, id., pp. 13-17, 
and assessed penalties in light of the totality of the circumstances, and the relative fault of 
the parties. Id., pp. 26-27, all while giving deference to the hearing officer's conclusions. L±, 
pp.6-8. Therefore, the fact that an old regulation has been reworded since the time Weaver 
was decided is a distinction without a difference, and does not provide the Department with 
a reason for ignoring the Weaver decision.6 
Furthermore, the CSRB itself made no mention of or comparison between, the old and 
new Rules when it addressed the Weaver decision. R., 151-152. Instead, the CSRB found 
6If the Department actually believed its own argument as to the CSRB's power to 
review a hearing officer's decision, it would not have ignored the fact that, despite 
acknowledging that 'wthe hearing officer did not separate these two allegations [against 
Moon] to determine their individual assessment of a penalty", R., 144, the CSRB went 
ahead and made its own findings and conclusions as to the correct penalty for the wildlife 
incident alone. 
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that Weaver was factually distinguishable from Moon's case, and that Moon's culpability was 
more akin to Anderson's actions than Weaver's. R. 152. Moon has already addressed why 
this is not so in his initial Appellate Brief, and this will not be repeated here. The 
Department has not attacked or rebutted such arguments before this Court, but instead has 
claimed simply that Weaver no longer applies. It is clear that this argument is fallacious, as 
the CSRB itself felt that the Weaver decision had to be addressed. Otherwise, some mention 
of its inapplicability would have been made. 
For each of these reasons, the Department's argument that Weaver no longer applies 
should be ignored. As Moon has already argued to this Court, Moon's actions, if anything, 
were less egregious than those committed by Dennis Weaver, while the status and 
circumstances of both Moon and Weaver were remarkably similar. Therefore, under CSRB 
precedent, as well as the "correct application of relevant policies, rules and statutes", Moon 
should not have been terminated for a single, unintentional offense. 
3. No Similarly Situated Department Employees Have Received Termination 
as Punishment for a First Offense. 
Moon argued in his Appellate Brief that no other Department employees had been 
terminated by the Department for a single, unintentional wildlife violation. Because Moon 
was terminated for his participation in such a violation, Moon argues that he was treated 
unfairly and arbitrarily by the Department, and that he had no warning that he might be 
terminated for such violation. In response, the Department states that none of the employees 
to which Moon refers in his Appellate Brief are "similarly situated" to Moon. This simply 
is not true. Indeed, the only reason one could argue that there are no "similarly situated" 
12 
employees is because the Department has never acted so unfairly and arbitrarily as it did 
against Moon. 
Moon has given examples of eight other Department employees who committed 
similar or more egregious acts, but were not terminated for such acts. The Department has 
chosen to address only three of these individuals, and has chosen to ignore the fact that rank 
of the individuals cited in Moon's earlier Appellate Brief range from park rangers to assistant 
wildlife managers, all of which (according to the Department) are guided by the same 
"mission" and policies. While it may be true that none of these individuals held the same title 
as Moon did, it cannot be said that they were not similarly situated. Each of these individuals 
illegally hunted and/or killed wildlife, and each of these individuals received punishment 
drastically less severe than that handed to Moon. Whatever the definition of "substantially 
similar" may be, it does not equate to "identical" as the Department would suggest;7 indeed, 
if comparisons were only to be made to "identically situated" employees as the Department 
urges, such comparisons could never be made at all.8 
7Pickett v. Dept. of Commerce, 858 P.2d 187 (Utah App. 1993) supports Moon's 
position. While the Court did not define "substantial similarity", it noted the importance 
(in relation to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii)) of comparing an employer's 
treatment of an employee with the employer's prior practices of discipline. Therefore, the 
Court compared the plaintiff with employees who committed "allegedly equal or more 
significant violations of the law, but received substantially lighter penalties." Id., at 191-
192 (emphasis added). Moon has requested that this Court make the same comparisons. 
8Finally, it should be noted that one of the only ways Moon had to obtain 
information concerning punishment of similarly situated employees is discovery through 
the Department. The Department has consistently denied complete discovery on this 
matter. For example, the Division redacted all names and gave only brief commentary of 
what occurred. Accordingly, if there are any deficiencies in the number of examples 
13 
Therefore, the Court should find instruction from the leniency shown by the Division 
of Wildlife Resources (DWR) to other similarly situated employees, and should hold that the 
termination of Moon for similar conduct was unwarranted, arbitrary and unreasonable. No 
one else in DWR history has been treated as poorly and unfairly as Moon for similar or even 
more egregious conduct. The same is true with the entire Department, with the exception of 
Dennis Weaver, whose termination was reversed. Through its treatment of similarly situated 
employees, the Department declared a policy which stated that a single, unintentional 
wildlife incident does not merit termination. The reason, as noted by Director John Kimball 
himself, is that employees are allowed an "honest mistake". R. 347. However, this policy 
was not to apply to Moon, and Moon alone. This would seem to be the very definition of 
arbitrary and unreasonable behavior on the part of Kimball and the Department, as well as 
the CSRB for upholding such behavior, providing Moon with no possible forewarning of his 
termination. 
4. The Board Ignored Regulatory Law When it Ignored Mitigating Factors. 
As argued in Moon's Appellate Brief, both the CSRB hearing officer and the CSRB 
itself largely ignored mitigating factors such as Moon's length of service with the State of 
Utah and the Department, his lack of prior infractions or discipline, and the fact that the 
punishment was more severe than that handled down previously by the Department. 
Fittingly, even the Department ignores the many mitigating circumstances of Moon's case 
in its Appellate Brief by stating that "Moon contends that his fifteen years of service with the 
given to the Court, the Department should not be heard to complain about them. 
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State of Utah is sufficient to overcome termination". Department's Brief, at p. 25. Moon 
contends that there is much more than this single factor, and that all of these factors render 
termination inappropriate for a single, off-duty act. 
The Department also attempts to casually dismiss both Utah Administrative Code 
R137-1-20(I) and R477-1 l-l(3)(e), and states that reviewing mitigating circumstances is an 
entirely optional criteria which can be ignored by the CSRB. The Utah Supreme Court and 
this Court have held otherwise. 
In State. Etc. v. Utah Merit System Council. 614 P.2d 1259, a similar argument was 
made regarding the Utah Merit System's procedural rules. However, the Court held to the 
contrary: 
Defendants contend that the procedural rules are merely "guidelines", but 
administrative regulations are presumed to be reasonable and valid and cannot 
be ignored or followed by the agency to suit its own purposes. Such is the 
essence of arbitrary and capricious action. Without compelling grounds for not 
following its rules, an agency must be held to them. 
614 P.2d at 1263. Similarly, as noted by this Court in Holland v. Career Service Review 
Board. 856 P.2d 678 (Utah App. 1993), "It does not logically follow that an agency has 
discretion to violate its own rules simply because it had discretion to make those rules." 856 
P.2d at 684 (Bench, concurring opinion). Judge Bench cited to the Utah Merit System 
Council case for authority. Id. See also R.O.A. General v. Utah Dept. of Transp.. 347 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 11, 12 (Utah 1998). 
It is clear that R137-1-20(I) and R477-1 l-l(3)(e) may not be ignored by the CSRB. 
Instead, as recognized by prior CSRB decisions, it is anticipated that factors such as past 
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work record, prior disciplinary actions, previous warnings, and consistent application of rules 
and standards will be investigated by the CSRB. See Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Rasmussen. 
2 PRB 19, at 28-31 (1986)(three pages of findings concerning mitigating circumstances 
alone); Trooper Joe C. Bennett v. Utah Highway Patrol, 2 PRB/H.O. 23 at 13,14; 24-29 
(independent findings of fact concerning mitigation utilized to set aside termination of 
employee); Bytheway v. Utah Dept. of Safety. 13 CSRB/H.O. 191 at 19-26 (1996) (eight 
pages discussing the mitigating factors of R477-11-1(1) before sustaining a dismissal). 
Otherwise, there would be no reason to include these Rules within the regulatory code. As 
Moon noted in his Appellate Brief, mitigating factors would have weighed in his favor had 
they been seriously considered by the CSRB. The Department's only response to this is that 
the "egregiousness" of Moon's acts outweighs his length of service, citing a case from the 
Illinois Court of Appeals. Even if length of service were the only mitigating factor involved 
here, and even if the CSRB had seriously considered this factor, the Department's citation 
is still off point. The Department's citation, Ruffin v. Dept. of Transp.. 428 N.E.2d 628 (111. 
App. 1981), dealt with an intentional violation by a state employee. Furthermore, there is no 
discussion as to whether regulatory guidelines existed regarding mitigating factors. If case 
law is to help in this regard, it should be from Utah courts, or at least should analyze similar 
regulatory guidelines as R. 137-1-20(1) and R.477-1 l-l(3)(e). The Department has presented 
no such case law. 
Moon requests that this Court not ignore Rl37-1-20(1) and R477-1 l-l(3)(e), as was 
done by the CSRB, and as the Department urges. Moon makes this request for one reason: 
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when the factors contained within these Rules are applied to Moon's case, it should become 
clear that Moon's termination was inappropriate in light of all the surrounding facts and 
circumstances. 
V. Nexus Has Not Been Established; Even if Established, Nexus Alone Does 
Not Require Termination. 
The Department has argued that Moon's off-duty, unintentional act has sufficient 
nexus to his employment so as to sustain his termination for the wildlife incident alone. 
While this is belied by the fact that the Department did not terminate Moon until the second 
"abuse of position" charge was conjured, infra, it is also belied by the nexus requirement 
itself. Furthermore, the Department does not explain why a finding of nexus requires 
termination, as opposed to demotion or another less onerous form of punishment. 
As noted by the Fifth Circuit, "in situations involving off-duty activities, the 
reviewing court will require the agency to demonstrate that removal will promote the 
efficiency of the service. Identification of the cause for removal is not sufficient; the agency 
must also establish the relationship between the employee misconduct and the adverse effect 
on the abilities to perform successfully its assigned functions." Bonet v. U.S. Postal Service. 
661 F.2d 1071,1079 (5th Cir. 1981). This is similar to the reasoning found in Jan Wahlquist 
v. Utah Dept. of Corrections. 15 CSRB/H.O. 220, which held that "broad policy statements 
and conclusions do not...constitute substantial evidence [for termination]." In fact, the 
Wahlquist case directly contradicts the Department's argument that it can fire an employee 
for off-duty acts which "may" or "might" cause problems within the Department: "if that 
were the case, any violation of policy could easily be characterized as a serious violation 
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meriting termination...any violation of any policy could be characterized as serious in that 
it indicates that an employee "might act inappropriately on the job or put other...in jeopardy" 
to justify termination...Substantial evidence requires a more fact intensive analysis. Id. at 
p.21. 
Here it is mere conjecture and self-serving testimony which has allowed the 
Department to justify its termination of Moon. See, e.g., Department's Brief, p.33. There 
has been no showing that Moon's ability to perform his position was affected by his off-duty, 
unintentional acts, and no showing that such ability will be impaired in the future. Instead, 
all the Department has produced is testimony that it "might" affect such performance.9 Moon 
should at least be given the chance to prove otherwise. 
Because no nexus has ever been shown which connects Moon's off-duty mistake with 
his ability to perform his position, his termination should be reversed. However, even if 
nexus has been established, the Department gives no explanation as to why a finding of 
nexus requires termination, as opposed to demotion, change of position, or other less drastic 
forms of punishment.10 If it is true, as the Department argues, that his ability to hold a 
"Clearfield City v. Dept. of Employment Sec. 663 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983), does not 
change this result. That case entailed unemployment benefits, and was covered by a 
statute which required that a claimant: (1) be discharged for an act or omission in 
connection with employment, which was (2) deliberate, willful or wanton. Id. at 442. This 
standard is not the same as the ''nexus" standard required by cases such as Wahlquist. Of 
course, Moon would be happy to have this standard apply, as his acts were neither 
deliberate, willful or wanton. 
10Indeed, throughout this case, the Department has wholly failed to explain why 
some less drastic form of punishment could not have been given, in light of Moon's prior 
record and lack of prior disciplinary problems. This simply fuels Moon's argument that 
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supervisory position may be affected by the wildlife incident, why could Moon not take a 
lower position, or one which focused on a different area? Why termination? This is 
something that has never been folly explained by the Department. There is nothing inherent 
in Utah or other case law which requires termination once a nexus is found; rather, 
termination for off-duty conduct includes a nexus as merely one of many requirements. The 
real question, as it always has been in this case, is whether Moon was rightfully terminated 
for a single (and off-duty) act of negligence, when termination was so disproportionate to the 
offense at issue. As this Court has previously noted, "If [an employee's] conduct was an 
isolated incident of poor judgment and there is no expectation that the conduct will be 
continued or repeated, potential harm may not be shown and therefore it is not necessary to 
dicharge the employee."Albertson's v. Dept. of Employment Sec, 854 P.2d 570, 574 (Utah 
App. 1993). Whether the Department is able to show a nexus or not, it is still unable to show 
that Moon's termination for an isolated incident is reasonable in light of all the facts, the 
CSRB's error, and relevant rules and case law. 
B. MOON'S RESPONSE TO THE DEPARTMENT'S CROSS-APPEAL. 
I. MOON DID NOT COMMIT AN ABUSE OF POSITION, 
Moon's arguments against the Department's Cross-Appeal are three-fold. First, the 
Department does not have standing to assert its Cross-Appeal, since it was not "substantially 
prejudiced'' by the CSRB's decision to uphold Moon's termination. Therefore, no appeal may 
be taken. Second, even if such standing did exist, it is clear that Moon did not commit an 
his termination was arbitrary and unreasonable. 
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"abuse of position" as alleged by the department. Moon did not obtain anything he was not 
otherwise entitled to, and did not use his position to obtain anything. Therefore, by 
definition, he did not engage in an abuse of his position. Finally, it is implicit from the 
Department's assertions to the contrary that Moon's wildlife violation alone was not sufficient 
to warrant termination. This same implicit admission was made when the Department 
refrained from immediately terminating Moon at the time the wildlife violation was 
committed. Therefore, as Moon argued to the CSRB, when the "abuse of position" 
allegations drop from the case, Moon's actions simply do not merit termination, for there is 
no longer a "pattern of conduct" as described by the CSRB hearing officer. For these 
reasons, the CSRB holding that Moon did not engage in an "abuse of position" should be 
upheld, while Moon's termination should be reversed. 
1. The Department May Not Assert Its Cross-Appeal. 
Moon has already argued in his Motion for Summary Disposition that the Department 
may not assert its Cross-Appeal, as the Department has not been substantially prejudiced nor 
"aggrieved" by the decision of the CSRB. Instead, the Department's decision to terminate 
Moon was upheld by the CSRB. Moon now renews his objection to the Department's Cross-
Appeal, as it is impermissible under the Utah Code.11 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16, which provides for judicial review of formal 
adjudicative proceedings, allows standing only for those who are "substantially prejudiced " 
11
 Moon refers the Court to his Memoranda supporting his Motion for Summary 
Disposition for a full discussion of this argument. 
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by a the decision of a tribunal. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(1953, as amended). 
Substantial prejudice "relates to the damage or harm suffered by the person seeking review 
and was written to ensure that a court will not issue advisory opinions reviewing agency 
action when no true controversy has resulted from that action." Savage Industries v. State 
Tax Com'n. 811 P.2d 664, 669 (Utah 1991)(emphasis added). The Department has suffered 
no harm or damage as a result of an agency decision - in this case the decision of the CSRB 
to affirm Moon's termination. Nonetheless, the Department still requests that this Court 
redetermine the findings of fact and conclusions of law which led to that decision. 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously held that a party should not be allowed to 
"employ its adversary's appeal or petition as a vehicle to gain a greater benefit than that 
granted below". State v. South. 924 P.2d 354, 356 (Utah 1996); see also Tacoma v. 
Taxpayers of City of Tacoma. 743 P.2d 793, 796 (Wash. 1987)("Because [appellant] merely 
objects to the reasoning by which the trial court invalidated the ordinance, [appellant] cannot 
be considered 'aggrieved', and therefore does not have standing to appeal.") The Department 
merely objects to the reasoning of the CSRB, and not to its final decision. Therefore, the 
Department should not be allowed to assert, and has no standing to assert, its Cross-Appeal. 
Since the Department has not been "substantially prejudiced" or otherwise 
"aggrieved", and therefore lacks standing to appeal, its Cross-Appeal should be dismissed. 
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2. Moon Did Not Commit An "Abuse of Position". 
a. Moon Did Not Obtain Anything He Was Not Entitled To; Nor Did He Use, 
Let Alone Abuse, His Position To Obtain His Son's Hunting Permit. 
The CSRB found that "Moon did not gain any personal, or family benefit, privilege, 
or advantage, nor did [his son] Ryan receive any benefit special privilege or advantage that 
he was not entitled to by law". R., 144. The CSRB further held that "the evidence as a 
whole does not show a violation of a rule, a statute or an abuse of authority or position by 
Randy Moon regarding his son's right to hunt". Id. As the Department has produced no 
evidence to show that such findings are not "reasonable and rational" under the 
circumstances of this case, this Court has no reason to overrule these particular findings of 
the CSRB. 
Moon was charged by the Department with a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 67-16-
4(3), which states that: 
A public officer or public employee may not: 
(3) use or attempt to use his official position to secure special privileges or 
exemptions for himself or others. 
By definition, in order to find someone liable under this provision, it must be shown 
that the officer under scrutiny acquired something to which he was not entitled, and that the 
officer obtained this "special privilege" due to the nature of the officer's position. Id. The 
facts presented to the CSRB revealed that these elements were missing. 
The facts of this case, and the findings of the CSRB, show that Moon did not use or 
abuse his position to obtain something he was not entitled to. Although Moon will not repeat 
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the entire list of facts which show he did not commit an "abuse of position9'12, it is important 
to set forth a few facts which are notably absent from the Department's Brief. 
First, it is clear that Ryan Moon was entitled to the PHU transfer. Ryan, as a public 
hunter, was entitled to the same hunting right as the private hunters. Indeed, when Haskell 
submitted his letter in early October, Ryan's name should have been on that list. R., 140. 
Cornicelli testified that if a second letter containing Ryan's name had come to him from 
Cornicelli, that the transfer would have been approved by the Department. Id. at 448-49. No 
special privileges were obtained for Ryan Moon and therefore, there is no abuse of position. 
Second, Ryan received neither the PHU permit, nor the addition of his name to the 
transfer list, unlawfully or through Moon's position with the Department. Moon never 
ordered or even requested that his son be placed on the transfer list. Instead, Moon only 
inquired as to how to correct this omission.13 This is precisely what a public citizen could 
have done to take care of the problem. Indeed, the Department presented no evidence that 
such an inquiry would be treated any differently coming from a citizen. Even John Kimball, 
the man responsible for Moon's termination, testified that Moon was not gaining a benefit 
that he was not entitled to. R., 412. The only evidence presented shows that anyone who had 
a similar problem could take care of it exactly as Moon did, and would be treated in the same 
*Moon refers the Court to the findings made by the CSRB as to the "abuse of 
position" charge, R., 135-144. 
I^t should be recalled that the transfer of the hunters to the "South Fork" PHU was 
allowed, and was done according to regulations. Haskell sent the appropriate transfer 
letter to the regional office; he simply forgot to add Ryan's name to that list. R., 136-137. 
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fashion as Moon. R., 699-703 (elk permits transferred in similar fashion). There is simply 
no proof that Moon used or abused his office to obtain "special privileges". 
Importantly, Cornicelli testified that at no time did he feel that he was pressured by 
Moon. R., 698-699. Further, Moon never told Cornicelli what to do nor did he request that 
Cornicelli take one course of action versus another. All Moon did was tell him the situation; 
it was Cornicelli and Hasenyager who made the decision to add Ryan's name to the pre-
existing letter. R., 141-143. 
Third, it should be remembered that Moon's only act, initiated after he was informed 
that his son was left off the PHU certificate, was to inquire as to how this problem should be 
solved. As noted by the CSRB, the Department admitted at the Step 5 hearing that it "does 
not have a written procedure, rule or guideline to deal with Ryan's situation where a name 
is negligently omitted from a PHU transfer request". R., 139. With a lack of regulatory 
guidance, Moon simply asked the "experts" what to do. The result was that Ryan's name was 
placed back on the list where it should have been in the first place. 
Such conduct on the part of Moon does not and cannot constitute abuse of position. 
Moon did not in any way use his position or authority to get Cornicelli, or anyone else in 
Cornicelli's office, to do something they did not want to do. Moon simply explained the 
situation to Cornicelli, and how it should be handled, and Cornicelli, in concert with his 
supervisor Hasenyager, decided how to handle the situation. While the Department now 
contends that the request that Ryan's name needed to be added should have been made in 
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writing, the Department can give no explanation as to why Cornicelli and Hasenyager did 
not explain that to Moon. If they had, Moon could have easily replied.14 
Finally, it should be noted that, although Utah Code Ann. § 67-16-4(3) prevents one 
from using an official position to secure special privileges for himself or others, this Chapter 
begins with the statement that it "does not intend to deny a public officer or employee the 
opportunities available to all other citizens of the state to acquire private . . . interests so long 
as this does not interfere with his full and faithful discharge of his public duties." Utah Code 
Ann. § 67-16-2. In other words, Moon cannot be guilty of an "abuse of position" unless he 
obtained something unavailable to any member of the public, or obtained something he was 
not entitled to. 
Moon neither asked for nor received any "special privileges", and did not use or 
abuse his position to obtain any such privilege. Therefore, the CSRB's findings that Moon 
did not engage in an "abuse of position" are reasonable and rational considering all the facts 
of this case. 
MThe Department's witnesses, Cornicelli, Hasenyager, Shields and others, also 
testified that these transfer rules were brand new for the '96 season. Cornicelli, in 
particular, testified that he was unfamiliar with their operation. R., 701. Indeed, the 
handling of the initial request from Cal Haskell in early October by Cornicelli and 
Hasenyager failed to follow Department procedures which required not a letter, but an 
amendment to the COR certificate, which amendment needed to be submitted to the 
office in Salt Lake (which was never done). 
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b. The Department Has Failed to Marshall the Evidence Against the 
CSRB's Determination That Moon Did Not Engage in an "Abuse of 
Position". 
Ironically, it is the Department which has failed to show that, despite the supporting 
evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, the findings of the 
CSRB concerning Moonfs alleged "abuse of position" are not supported by substantial 
evidence given the record as a whole. Stewart v. Bd. of Review., 831 P.2d 134, 138 (Utah 
App, 1992). Instead, it is clear from the preceding section that, when "every scrap of 
competent evidence" is reviewed, West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 
1315 (Utah App. 1991), the only reasonable holding is that Moon did not engage in an "abuse 
of position". 
The Department argues that the CSRB was simply incorrect in its findings that Moon 
did not obtain anything to which he was not legally entitled, and that Moon did not use or 
abuse his position to do so. However, the Department fails to follow its own advice as written 
in its response to Moon's Appeal - it fails to marshal the evidence which shows that (1) 
Moon's son was entitled to the PHU transfer, (2) no violation of rule or statute occurred, and 
(3) Moon did not abuse his position in order to place his son on the PHU transfer, "where it 
lawfully belonged". R., 143.15 Instead, it is clear from the facts outlined above, and those 
found by the CSRB, that the evidence as a whole show that Moon did not engage in an 
*It is also clear that the CSRB examined the Department's case law on "abuse of 
position", certain of which have been restated in the Department's Cross-Appeal, and 
found that such cases "do not apply to the facts and circumstances of [Moon's] situation". 
R., 143. 
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"abuse of position". Accordingly, the Court should accept the findings of the tribunal as to 
the "abuse of position" charge. 
3. The Existence of the Department's Cross-Appeal Provides Further Proof 
That Moon's Termination Alone is Insufficient to Merit Termination, 
Inherent in this case is the question, why would the Department appeal a decision in 
its favor if the wildlife incident alone was sufficient cause to terminate Moon? The answer 
to this question - that the wildlife incident was not sufficient cause - is borne out not only by 
the legal arguments posted by Moon in his Appellate Brief, and in section A of this brief, but 
statements (both implicit and explicit) made by both the Step 5 hearing officer and the 
Department itself. 
In its decision to uphold Moon's termination, the Step 5 hearing officer held that 
Moon "was involved in two separate and serious incidents. The two incidents show a pattern 
of conduct which exhibits less than high regard for complying with the Division's rules and 
policies." R., 52. The Step 5 hearing officer also noted that the Department itself, through 
Director John Kimball, stated that Moon was terminated for this "pattern of conduct": 
I am notifying you of my intent to impose disciplinary action for wildlife-
related violations and the abuse of your position as related to the transfer of a 
moose permit... 
R., 38(emphasis added). 
It is clear, and the CSRB so held, that Moon did not commit an "abuse of position". 
Thus, all the Department has to hang its termination of Moon on is the wildlife incident. Yet, 
the Department did not terminate Moon when it learned of Moon's participation, if any, in 
the wildlife incident. R., 38. Instead, it authorized and then waited until an investigation 
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came up with the second charge. Only after this second charge was made was Moon 
terminated. Id. When asked about whether the wildlife incident alone was enough to 
terminate Moon, Director Kimball was less than unequivocal: "It wasn't alone. [So] I can't 
tell you that." R., 144. Indeed, this statement is telling. If the wildlife incident had been 
enough to terminate Moon, Kimball would have stated as much. Kimball did not do so. If the 
wildlife incident had been enough, Moon would have been terminated after the incident was 
discovered, but he was not terminated. 
Therefore, without the "pattern of conduct" upon which the Step 5 hearing officer 
based her determination, and with the tacet admission by the Department itself that the 
wildlife incident alone was not sufficient to terminate Moon, the Department has been forced 
to assert its Cross-Appeal. Accordingly, since there is no merit to this Cross-Appeal (nor 
even standing to assert it), Moon requests that this Court reverse his termination, on a basis 
that all parties already understand - that Moon's participation in the wildlife incident is so 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed as to constitute legal error. 
CONCLUSION 
Moon's actions do not merit termination. While Moon may have made a mistake by 
acting negligently, this mistake does not deserve the drastic penalty of dismissal. This 
penalty is simply not proportionate to the offense, and very inappropriate considering all of 
the mitigating circumstances of this case, including the fact that Moon was off-duty at the 
time of the incident. 
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Furthermore, the Department's Cross-Appeal is without merit, while the Department 
is without standing to assert it. The facts clearly show that Moon did not engage in an "abuse 
of position", since he did not acquire any special privileges, and did not use or abuse his 
position at all. 
Moon is certainly entitled to one reasonable mistake during a period of nearly two 
decades of loyal and reputable public service. Moon urges the Court to overrule the CSRB's 
decision to uphold Moon's termination based on his single, unintentional mistake. 
DATED this ^ day of October, 1998. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Bradley M. Strassberg 
Attorneys for Grievant 
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Dimas BONET, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Respondent 
No. 80-1502 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FIFTH CIRCUIT 
661 F.2d 1071; 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 15839; 108 L.R.R.M. 3158 
November 20, 1981 
PRIOR HISTORY: from were instituted subsequent to the January 11, 
1979, effective date of the Act, its provisions for 
judicial review apply to the instant appeal. Civil 
Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub.L.No. 95-454, 
§ 907, 92 Stat. 1111, 1227 (1978). See Motley 
v. Secretary of the United States Dep 't of the Army, 
608 Eld 122 (5th Cir. 1979). Thus, appeal from 
the final administrative decision is made directly 
to a United States Court of Appeals. 5 U.S.C. § 
7705(a)(1) & (b)(1). 
Petition for Review of an Order of the Merit Systems 
Protection Board. 
CORE TERMS: misconduct, removal, nexus, postal 
service, applicant, off-duty, postal, indictment, effec-
tive, indecent, adversely affect, public confidence, im-
moral conduct, indecency, substantial evidence, judicial 
review, suitability, immoral, disciplinary action, dis-
graceful, unsupported, manager, fitness, sexual miscon-
duct, stepdaughter, notoriously, regulation, personnel, 
adversely, dishonest 
COUNSEL: Armando Peralta, Gus Rallis, El Paso, 
Tex., for petitioner. 
Alexander Younger, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. 
C , for respondent. 
JUDGES: Before POLITZ and RANDALL, Circuit 
Judges, and PARKER n*, District Judge. 
* District Judge of the Middle District of 
Louisiana, sitting by designation. 
OPINIONBY: POLITZ 
OPINION: [*1072] 
This appeal arises pursuant to the judicial review pro-
visions of the Civil Service Reform [*1073] Act of 1978 
(the Act), 5 U.S.C. § 7703. nl Dimas Bonet appeals 
the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (the 
Board) affirming his discharge from employment with 
the United States Postal Service (Postal Service) because 
of alleged grossly immoral off-duty conduct. Finding 
no evidence in support of the conclusion that Bonet's re-
moval will promote the efficiency of the Postal Service, 
we reverse and remand for further proceedings. 
n l . Since the administrative proceedings appealed 
The Facts 
On November 28, 1979, Dimas Bonet was fired from 
the Postal Service after serving 21 years with that depart-
ment (and a total 24 years with the federal government). 
At the time of his discharge, Bonet was manager of an 
El Paso, Texas, post office branch station. 
The Postal Service instituted an investigation of Bonet 
following the August 11, 1979, publication in an El Paso 
newspaper of the names of 22 people, including Bonet, 
who were indicted by an El Paso county grand jury. 
Bonet was charged with indecency with a child. The 
indictment was based upon an alleged indecent act by 
Bonet involving his eleven-year-old stepdaughter. On 
September 7, 1979, the indictment against Bonet was 
dismissed, due to the unwillingness of the mother to 
prosecute and a family reconciliation. 
The Postal Service secured a copy of the district at-
torney's file and, on October 25, 1979, issued Bonet 
a notice of proposed removal. Simultaneously, Bonet 
was suspended, effective October 29, 1979. The Postal 
Service's proposed removal action was based on: (1) the 
charge against Bonet of indecency with a child, and (2) 
other alleged acts of indecency committed by Bonet said 
to constitute criminal, dishonest, notoriously disgrace-
ful, and immoral conduct. Bonet denied the charges. On 
November 8, 1979, the Postal Service removed Bonet 
on the basis of the two charges listed in the notice of 
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proposed removal. 
Bonet appealed the Postal Service decision to the Merit 
Systems Protection Board, which affirmed the agency 
action, finding that both charges were supported by a 
preponderance of the evidence. n2 Moreover, the Board 
concluded that Bonet's removal would promote the effi-
ciency of the Postal Service. 
n2. The evidence included a copy of the newspaper 
article in which Bonet's name and address appeared 
and the following items taken from the district attor-
ney's file: (1) the statements of the eleven-year-old 
and twelve-year-old stepdaughters of Bonet detailing 
incidents involving Bonet's indecent conduct with 
them; (2) the statement of a detective who took the 
report of Bonet's six-year-old stepdaughter in which 
she related one incident involving Bonet's indecent 
conduct with her; and (3) the statement of Bonet's 
wife, the mother of the girls, describing one inci-
dent she witnessed involving Bonet's indecent con-
duct with one of her daughters. 
On appeal, Bonet contends that no findings were made 
and no evidence exists in the record to support the con-
clusion that his discharge will promote the efficiency 
of the service. Accordingly, Bonet argues, the Board's 
decision was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of dis-
cretion, and, therefore, must be reversed. 
The Statutory Provisions 
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub.L.No. 
95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified in scattered sections of 
5 U.S.C.), retains the same measure of protection for the 
federal civilian employee that was guaranteed by statute 
n3 prior to enactment of the new civil service legislation. 
Thus, the 1978 Act provides that the federal government 
employer may discharge its employees "only for such 
cause as will promote the efficiency of the [*1074] ser-
vice." 5 U.S.C. 7575(a). The 1978 Act further provides 
that, absent criminal conviction, an agency may take dis-
ciplinary action against an employee only on the basis of 
conduct that adversely affects the performance of the em-
ployee himself or of other employees. n4 Administrative 
regulations adopted to effectuate the purposes of the Act 
specify that disciplinary action against any employee to 
"promote the efficiency of the service" must be based on: 
(1) whether the conduct of the individual may reasonably 
be expected to adversely affect effective performance by 
the employee of the duties of his position, or (2) whether 
such conduct may reasonably be expected to adversely 
affect the effective performance by the agency itself of 
its duties and responsibilities. n5 
n3. Originally enacted by Pub.L.No. 89-554, 80 
Stat. 527 (1966) (and formerly codified at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 7507(a)). 
n4. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)( 10). The section pro-
hibits agency personnel action that discriminates for 
or against any employee "on the basis of conduct 
which does not adversely affect the performance of 
the employee" or "the performance of others," except 
that in determining suitability the agency may take 
"into account" any "conviction" of the employee for 
any crime. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10). See Comment, 
Removal for Cause from the Civil Service: The 
Problem of Disproportionate Discipline 28 Am. U.L. 
Rev. 207, 211 n.28 (1979). 
n5. 5 C.F.R. § 731.201 & § 731.202(a). 
Under these regulations, the Office of Personnel 
Management, before it can instruct an agency to re-
move an employee, must determine that such action 
will promote the efficiency of the service on the basis 
of: 
(1) Whether the conduct of the individual may rea-
sonably be expected to interfere with or prevent ef-
fective performance in the position applied for or 
employed in; or 
(2) Whether the conduct of the individual may rea-
sonably be expected to interfere with or prevent ef-
fective performance by the employing agency of its 
duties and responsibilities. 
5 C.F.R. § 731.202(a). 
Accordingly, in an agency removal action based on 
employee misconduct, the agency must make two de-
terminations: (1) that the employee, in fact, commit-
ted the alleged misconduct; and (2) that the employee's 
discharge, based on this misconduct, will promote the 
efficiency of the service. Cooper v. United States, 226 
Ct. CI 75, 639 Eld 727 (Ct.Cl. 1980); Phillips v. 
Bergland, 586 Eld 1007 (4th Cir. 1978). With re-
gard to the latter determination, the statutory scheme 
anticipates that the agency will establish what has been 
termed a "vital nexus" between the misconduct-whether 
it be criminal, immoral, or both-and the efficiency of 
the service. See Cooper v. United States, 639 F.2d at 
729; Phillips v. Bergland, 586 R2d at 1011; Young 
v. Hampton, 568 E2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1977); Doe 
v. Hampton, 184 U.S. App. D.C. 373, 566 Eld 265 
(D.C.Cir. 1977). 
The Standard of Judicial Review 
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With the enactment of the civil service reform legis-
ation in 1978, Congress supplied the courts of appeals 
•vith a specific standard of review applicable in federal 
employee appeals from adverse agency action. The re-
viewing court is directed to set aside any agency action, 
findings, or conclusions found to be: 
(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law; 
(2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, 
or regulation having been followed; or 
(3) unsupported by substantial evidence. 
5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). n6 
n6. The same standard of review was applied 
by a majority of the circuits prior to the enactment 
of this specific provision for judicial review. See, 
e.g., DeLong v. Hampton, 422 E2d 21 (3d Cir. 
1970); Byrd v. Campbell, 591 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 
1979); Elliott v. Phillips, 611 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 
1979); Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145 (9th Cir. 
1980); Henkle v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 
1980); Johnson v. United States, 202 U.S. App. 
D.C. 187, 628 E2d 187 (D.C.Cir. 1980); Masino v. 
United States, 218 Ct. CI. 531, 589 F.2d 1048 
(Ct.CI. 1978). 
At least one circuit had rejected the substantial ev-
idence element of the pre-Act majority review stan-
dard. See Young v. Hampton, 568 F.2d 1253 (7th 
Cir. 1977); Wroblaski v. Hampton, 528 F2d 852 
(7th Cir 1976). 
The essence of Bonet's complaint on appeal is that the 
agency decision is arbitrary and capricious because it 
is not based on specific findings of a "nexus" between 
the charged misconduct and the efficiency of [*1075] 
the service, and that the record would not support such 
findings. n7 
n7. Bonet does not raise as an issue on appeal 
whether substantial evidence exists in the adminis-
trative record to support the finding that Bonet com-
mitted the conduct charged. We, therefore, do not 
discuss that element of the agency's removal action. 
We find no evidence exists in the administrative record 
to support the conclusion that Bonet's removal will pro-
mote the efficiency of the service. The administrative 
finding rests on the assumption that the retention of an 
employee who commits sexually indecent conduct with 
minors, regardless of any circumstances and without re-
gard to whether this conduct is a matter of public knowl-
edge or not, necessarily reflects adversely on the image 
of the service, and the further assumption that sanctions 
against an employee who violates a general standard of 
off-duty conduct expected of employees necessarily pro-
motes the efficiency of the service. 
The Agency Record and the Administrative Findings 
Bonet's discharge is based upon his off-duty conduct 
constituting a violation of section 661.53 of the Code of 
Ethical Conduct, Employee and Labor Relations Manual 
of the United States Postal Service. Section 661.53, en-
titled "Unacceptable Conduct," provides: 
No employee will engage in criminal, dishonest, no-
toriously disgraceful or immoral conduct, or other con-
duct prejudicial to the Postal Service. Conviction of a 
violation of any criminal statute may be grounds for dis-
ciplinary action by the Postal Service, in addition to any 
other penalty imposed by or pursuant to statute. 
The formal notice of proposed discharge lists two 
charges, alleging five sexually indecent acts Bonet com-
mitted with his stepdaughters in his home. The notice 
concludes: "Conduct of this nature reflects unfavorably 
upon the image of the U. S. Postal Service and flagrantly 
violates the standards of conduct prescribed for-and re-
quired of-all employees." 
The agency discharge, affirmed by the Board, relied 
upon the following evidentiary showings: (a) the copy 
of a newspaper account of 22 indictments by the county 
grand jury, one of which named Bonet, gave his address 
and noted the offense ("indecency with a child"), with-
out identifying him as a postal employee; and (b) two 
in-house investigative memoranda prepared by a postal 
inspector identifying and attaching the district attorney's 
file, accompanied by a copy of a Texas statute indicating 
that the conduct charged was criminal. The memoranda 
noted that the indictment had been dismissed, primar-
ily at the insistence of the mother of the children, since 
a reconciliation had been effected. The agency report 
in support of the dismissal acknowledged a communi-
cation from the Texas Department of Human Resources 
advising that the state agency was not filing any charges 
in connection with the allegations of sexual misconduct 
and commending Bonet and his family for the initiative 
exercised by them in resolving their problems. 
Finding the sexual misconduct proved by the affi-
davits, the Postal Service discharged Bonet for gross 
immorality. The agency acknowledged that Bonet was 
"a good manager," but stated: 
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(H)is discharge is not predicated upon his work record 
during the period of his employment, but is predicated 
upon the appellant's immoral conduct -unacceptable con-
duct for a postal employee .... (T)he acts committed by 
the appellant, if committed off duty, if a serious crime, 
and if immoral or unethical is (sic) sufficient justifi-
cation for discipline up to and including discharge .... 
The acts committed by the appellant are acts protected 
against in every nation of this globe. It rubs strongly 
against the moral fiber of a civilized society-it cannot be 
said to be ethical; it cannot be said to be moral. While 
the appellant may argue that it is not job related, it is 
certainly conduct that is contrary to established work 
rules [*1076] and language of the ELM (Employees and 
Labor Relations Manual). 
(Emphasis in original.) 
At this point, we note the following: (1) The agency 
made no finding, nor was there any evidentiary showing 
that the private immoral conduct adversely affected the 
employee in the performance of its function; (2) the in-
dictment for indecent conduct with a minor is shown to 
have been dismissed; and (3) so far as the record shows, 
the private sexual misconduct in Bonet's home is known 
to the employing authority only because of an in-house 
postal investigation. A dismissed indictment as to one 
incident, without more, does not show public knowl-
edge of the employee's sexual misconduct or that it is 
"notorious." 
The Administrative Review 
On review of the agency's discharge of Bonet, the 
Merit Systems Protection Board found the substantive 
misconduct to be proved adequately and found that it 
constituted cause for discharge, being conduct in viola-
tion of section 661.53, the code of ethical conduct for 
employees. As noted, this section prohibits any em-
ployee from engaging "in criminal, dishonest, notori-
ously disgraceful or immoral conduct, or other conduct 
prejudicial to the Postal Service." (Emphasis added.) 
For purposes of argument, the Board accepted the em-
ployee's contention that the conduct was not "criminal." 
It held, however, that the conduct was "disgraceful," 
"immoral," and "notorious" as (in the Board's words) 
"evidenced by the newspaper item which identified the 
appellant as having been charged with the offense of 
Indecency with a Child." (Emphasis added.) 
We have already stated that a dismissed indictment 
does not, without more, constitute notorious knowledge 
of conduct merely charged by an indictment. Nor are we 
persuaded of the correctness of the Board's unsupported 
assumption that because Bonet was the manager of a 
large urban branch office, "(therefore) he was known as 
a Postal employee by a large segment of the population." 
(Emphasis added.) Aside from these deficiencies in the 
findings, the Board fell into clear error in concluding-on 
the showing made-that the discharge was shown to "pro-
mote the efficiency of the service," a statutory prerequi-
site for disciplinary action against a protected employee. 
The Efficiency of the Service Determination 
Before the Board and this court, the Postal Service ar-
gued that to maintain Bonet as a branch manager of an 
important postal station, in light of public knowledge of 
his indictment for indecency with a child, could conceiv-
ably undermine the public confidence and trust in postal 
employees necessary for the efficient collection and de-
livery of the mails. Based upon this reasoning n8-albeit 
unsupported by any evidentiary showing on the adminis-
trative record-the Board found, "the conduct with which 
(Bonet) was charged could reasonably be expected to in-
terfere with or prevent the effective performance by the 
agency of its duties and responsibilities." 
n8. The agency's argument that the public confi-
dence will possibly be undermined absent Bonet's re-
moval applies only to the charge against Bonet based 
upon his indictment for indecency with a child. The 
Board's statement that the charge of criminal, dis-
honest, notoriously disgraceful, and immoral con-
duct with regard to other sexual incidents is "part 
and parcel of the same behavior for which he was in-
dicted and which thereby became generally known," 
is unfounded. Evidence is lacking that the specifics 
of that conduct were made available to the public in 
general at any time, or will become known publicly 
in the future. Thus, considering the inapplicabil-
ity of the public confidence argument to the second 
charge of misconduct, we find that the agency made 
no attempt to establish a nexus between that conduct 
and the efficiency of the service. 
The agency cannot satisfy the statutory requirement 
that an employee's removal promote the efficiency of 
the service by use of unsupported, general assertions 
that such action is necessary to maintain the public con-
fidence. To permit otherwise would be to render nuga-
tory the protections afforded the federal employee by the 
imposition [*1077] of a standard for removal which re-
quires a connection between employee misconduct (espe-
cially when off-duty and non-work related) and the job. 
n9 The agency must demonstrate, therefore, a relation-
ship between this employee's misconduct and the spectre 
that public confidence will be undermined. See Phillips 
v. Bergland; Young v. Hampton; Doe v. Hampton. See 
also Comment, supra note 4, at 227. 
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n9. As the court emphasized in Doe v. Hampton, 
184 U.S. App. D.C. 373, 566 E2d 265, 272 n.20 
(D.C.Cir. 1977): 
The nexus requirement serves the salutary end of 
helping to ensure against abuse of personnel regula-
tions by mandating that an adverse action be taken 
only for reasons that are directly related to a le-
gitimate governmental interest, such as job perfor-
mance. As a corollary, it also serves to minimize 
unjustified governmental intrusions into the private 
activities of federal employees. 
Nor is it sufficient that the agency rely on internal reg-
ulations proscribing in general certain employee conduct 
(e.g., "immoral" or "disgraceful") as proof of the re-
quired nexus. The Postal Service's reliance on its code 
of ethical conduct in this respect amounts to a presumed 
or per se nexus. The government maintains that a per 
se nexus is appropriate when the employee engages in 
conduct like that charged to Bonet. While we agree 
that the off-duty conduct attributed to Bonet is indeed 
reprehensible-and we, by no means, intend to mitigate 
or condone such conduct by our disposition of the in-
stant appeal, nor to intimate upon proper showing of 
nexus that it could not be cause for disciplinary action-
we cannot agree that the agency is thereby relieved of 
its statutory duty to determine the requisite connection 
between the employee misconduct and the possible un-
dermining of public confidence. 
Despite our reflective revulsion for the type of off-
duty misconduct in question, whether resulting from a 
now-cured mental disability or not, the 1978 Act does 
not permit this court nor an employing agency to char-
acterize off-duty conduct as so obnoxious as to show, 
per se, a nexus between it and the efficiency of the ser-
vice. The 1978 Act prohibits the discharge of a federal 
employee for conduct that does not adversely affect the 
performance of that employee or his co-employees, 5 
U.S.C. § 2J02(b)(lO). nlO While the administrative 
[*1078] regulations provide that an essential determina-
tion for discharge of an employee to promote the effi-
ciency of the service is that the conduct charged must rea-
sonably be expected to adversely affect the employee's 
effective performance of his duties or the effective per-
formance by the employing agency of its responsibilities. 
5 C.F.R. §731.202(a). See note 5, supra. Furthermore, 
the statutory standard of judicial review now applicable 
directs us to set aside any agency findings or conclu-
sions found to be unsupported by substantial evidence. 
5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). 
nlO. 5 U.S.C. § 2J02(b)(lO) provides: 
Any employee who has authority to take, direct 
others to take, recommend, or approve any person-
nel action, shall not, with respect to such authority-
(10) discriminate for or against any employee or 
applicant for employment on the basis of conduct 
which does not adversely affect the performance of 
the employee or applicant or the performance of oth-
ers; except that nothing in this paragraph shall pro-
hibit an agency from taking into account in deter-
mining suitability or fitness any conviction of the 
employee or applicant for any crime under the laws 
of any State, or the District of Columbia, or of the 
United States. 
In enacting this 1980 provision, Congress was 
specifically concerned that disciplinary action not be 
directed against a protected employee for off-duty 
misconduct unless it was related to the employee's 
or the agency's performance of duty. See House 
Conference Report No. 95-1717, 95th Cong.2d 
Sess., reprinted in (1978) U.S.Code Cong. & 
Ad.News 2723, 2864. Entitled "Conduct Unrelated 
to Job Performance," the report states: 
The Senate bill contains no express provision con-
cerning nonperformance related conduct of an em-
ployee or applicant. 
The House amendment specifies that it is a prohib-
ited personnel practice to discriminate for or against 
any employee or applicant on the basis of conduct 
which does not adversely affect the performance of 
the employee or applicant or the performance of oth-
ers. The bill also provides, though, that nothing in 
the paragraph shall prohibit an agency from taking 
into account any conviction of the employee or ap-
plicant for any crime of violence or moral turpitude 
when determining suitability or fitness. 
The conference report in section 2302(b)(10) 
adopts the House provision modified so that con-
viction of a crime may be taken into account when 
determining fitness or suitability of an employee or 
applicant. This provision is not meant as an encour-
agement to take conviction of a crime into account 
when determining the suitability or fitness of an em-
ployee or applicant for employment. Nor is it to be 
inferred that conviction of a crime is meant to dis-
qualify an employee or an applicant from employ-
ment. The conferees intend that only conduct of the 
employee or applicant that is related to the duties to 
be assigned to an employee or applicant or to the 
employee's or applicant's performance or the per-
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formance of others may be taken into consideration 
in determining that employee's suitability or fitness. 
Conviction of a crime which has no bearing on the 
duties to be assigned to an employee or applicant or 
on the employee's or applicant's performance or the 
performance of others may not be the basis for dis-
crimination for or against an employee or applicant. 
These provisions clearly signal a legislative intent that 
the agency must demonstrate by sufficient evidence that 
the off-duty misconduct, upon which the disciplinary 
action is founded, adversely affects the performance of 
the duties of the employee or of the agency. We further 
conclude, in light of the statutory requirements, that the 
reviewing authority may not place upon the employee, 
as the Board did, the burden of showing that his con-
tinued employment will not affect the efficiency of the 
service. The Board may not shift the burden of proof by 
presumption or application of the per se rule. 
Those pre-Act cases recognizing that certain employee 
misconduct on its face establishes the requisite nexus can 
generally be distinguished as involving work-related ac-
tivities easily identifiable with and directly connected 
to employee performance and agency efficiency. Thus, 
the following misconduct has been considered to have a 
bearing "on its face" on the efficiency of the service: in-
subordination, n i l falsification of official time reports, 
nl2 and misuse of official funds. nl3 Similarly, cer-
tain misconduct, although taking place away from the 
workplace, has been found to be so closely associated 
with the type of work performed by the employee that 
the nexus can be presumed. In Hoover v. United States, 
206 Ct.Cl. 640, 513 E2d 603 (O.CL1975), the re-
moval of an IRS tax technician responsible for oversee-
ing taxpayer returns, who himself falsified his personal 
tax returns, was upheld. 
n i l . Henklev. Campbell, 626E2d811 (10th Cir. 
1980); Meehan v. Macy, 129 U.S. App. D.C. 217, 
392 F.2d 822 (D. C. Cir. 1968). 
nl2. Pascal v. United States, 211 Ct. CI. 183, 
543 E2d 1284 (Ct. CI.1976). 
nl3. Terry v. United States, 204 Ct.Cl. 543, 499 
E2d 695 (1974), cert, denied, 421 U.S. 912, 95 S. 
Ct. 1567, 43 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1975). 
However, when the employee misconduct is off-duty 
and non-work related, even before the 1978 Act, the 
courts have been generally unwilling to presume that the 
discharge will promote the efficiency of the service. nl4 
Therefore, the courts have reversed [*1079] employee 
discharges founded on the following conduct: homosex-
ual advances, nl5 physical attack of a fellow employee, 
nl6 and conviction for possession of marijuana. nl7 The 
general thrust of these cases is that in situations involv-
ing off-duty activities, the reviewing court will require 
the agency to demonstrate that removal will promote the 
efficiency of the service. Identification of the cause for 
removal is not sufficient; the agency must also establish 
the relationship between the employee misconduct and 
the adverse effect on its abilities to perform successfully 
its assigned functions. nl8 
nl4. However, in Gueory v. Hampton, 167 U.S. 
App. D.C. 1, 510 E2d 1222 (D.C.Cir. 1974), the 
court relied on the agency's regulatory determina-
tion that criminal conduct is such cause as will pro-
mote the efficiency of the service and, in effect, rec-
ognized a presumed nexus between the employee's 
conviction of manslaughter and the efficiency of the 
service. The Court of Claims cited Gueory with 
approval in Wathen v. United States, 208 Ct. CI. 
342, 527 E2d 1191, 1197 (Ct.Cl.1975), cert, de-
nied, 429 U.S. 821, 97 S. Ct. 69, 50 L. Ed. 2d 
82 (1976), which upheld the discharge of a federal 
civilian employee, who was indicted for murder and 
found innocent by reason of his insanity. To the ex-
tent that these opinions stand for the proposition that, 
in those circuits, a per se nexus is recognized even 
when off-duty misconduct is charged, they should 
be limited to criminal misconduct of the severity of 
homicide. 
The only opinion from this circuit which might 
be read to support the government's position, 
Anonymous v. Macy, 398 E2d 317 (5th Cir. 1968), 
is distinguishable on the basis of the standard of ju-
dicial review then applied by the reviewing court. 
The court upheld the discharge of a postal employee 
charged with engaging in homosexual acts, despite 
counsel's argument that the employee's conduct was 
private and, therefore, did not affect the efficiency 
of the service. Significantly, the court limited its 
review of the agency decision to a determination of 
whether it was reached in compliance with proce-
dural requisites. Since the court refused to exam-
ine the merits of the decision-that is, whether the 
agency properly concluded that the employee's re-
moval would promote the efficiency of the service-it 
does not support the proposition that certain off-duty 
conduct will support a per se nexus. 
nl5. Norton v. Macy, 135 U.S. App. D.C. 
214, 417 E2d 1161 (D.C.Cir. 1969). See Schlegel 
v. United States, 189 Ct. CI. 30, 416 E2d 1372 
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(Ct. CI. 1969) (upholding an employee discharge on 
the basis of homosexual conduct, but not without 
first finding that the administrative record contained 
convincing proof that the employee's removal pro-
moted the efficiency of the service). 
nl6. Phillips v. Bergland, 586 E2d 1007 (4th 
Or, 1977). 
nl7. Young v. Hampton, 568 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 
1977). 
nl8. The government relies on Cooper v. United 
States, 226 Ct. CI. 75, 639 F.2d 727, in support of 
its contention that, at least where the employee's mis-
conduct is so obviously immoral (and generally con-
sidered so), a per se nexus is established. In Cooper, 
however, (in which the employee was discharged for 
indecent sexual conduct with a 5-year-old) the court 
on first appeal reversed the discharge on the basis that 
there was no substantial evidence demonstrating that 
the misconduct occurred. There was evidence in the 
record relative to the "nexus between appellant's al-
leged conduct and the efficiency of the service." See 
opinion of the Merit Systems Protection Board on 
remand, decision number AT752B7790411, March 
25, 1981, aff'd by order of the Court of Claims, July 
10, 1981, in docket number 493-79C. Moreover, 
while the court on initial appeal indicated implied 
that it would have upheld the agency's finding that 
the charged sexual misconduct adversely affected the 
employer-employee relationship, it in no way in-
ferred that it would do so in the absence of proof 
in support of the agency's determination. To the 
contrary, the Court of Claims stated that this determi-
nation "must be supported by substantial evidence." 
639 E2d at 729. 
In the instant case, the Postal Service admitted that 
Bonet's employment record was satisfactory throughout 
his 21 year tenure and that he was considered a good sta-
tion manager. The agency considered that Bonet's work 
record was not at issue. Rather, the issue was whether 
Bonet's private immoral conduct was unacceptable con-
duct for a postal employee. We agree that Bonet's mis-
conduct may be unacceptable for a postal employee, or at 
least for a visible management position. However, it can 
only be the basis for discharge if the agency proves by 
adequate evidence that the conduct adversely affects the 
efficiency of the postal service. In the absence of any 
attempt on the part of the agency to prove any actual 
nexus between the misconduct and the position of em-
ployment, we cannot uphold the decision to discharge. 
Appropriate Disposition 
We must set aside the Board's affirmance of the 
agency's discharge of Bonet. The conclusory findings 
do not support the determination that his discharge will 
promote the efficiency of the service. The record is 
devoid of proof that Bonet's continued employment is 
detrimental to the public confidence and trust in the 
Postal Service or in its employees. Our decision rests 
partially on the basis of the 1978 legislation apparently 
not noted as applicable by either the employee or the 
agency in the prior proceedings. Under these circum-
stances, we deem it appropriate to remand this cause 
to the Board, with leave to remand to the agency, if it 
so chooses, for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
REVERSED and REMANDED. 
